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Arbitrary-sized Image Training and Residual Kernel
Learning: Towards Image Fraud Identification
Hongyu Li, Member, IEEE, Xiaogang Huang, Zhihui Fu, and Xiaolin Li
Abstract—Preserving original noise residuals in images are
critical to image fraud identification. Since the resizing operation
during deep learning will damage the microstructures of image
noise residuals, we propose a framework for directly training
images of original input scales without resizing. Our arbitrary-
sized image training method mainly depends on the pseudo-batch
gradient descent (PBGD), which bridges the gap between the
input batch and the update batch to assure that model updates
can normally run for arbitrary-sized images. In addition, a 3-
phase alternate training strategy is designed to learn optimal
residual kernels for image fraud identification. With the learnt
residual kernels and PBGD, the proposed framework achieved
the state-of-the-art results in image fraud identification, especially
for images with small tampered regions or unseen images with
different tampering distributions.
Index Terms—Image Fraud Identification, Gradient Descent,
Image Noise Residual, Image Training
I. INTRODUCTION
Image fraud is becoming simpler and more accessible with
the rapid advancement of the image-editing software. As a
result, image fraud identification has attracted much attention
of Internet finance companies and the vision community in
recent years. Two types of image forgery, copy-move and
splicing, are frequent and thus more concerned. For copy-
move, pixels are copied and pasted within an image, while
splicing generally joins image patches from different images
by sticking them together.
On copy-move and splicing detection, most methods depend
on such intrinsic information as image semantics or image
noise residuals. In order to make full use of such information,
the methods usually deal with images in two different ways,
blockwise or global. The blockwise approaches [1], [2] extract
compact representations of latent features on local image
patches. Obviously, they tend to suffer from high false positive
rates on fraudulent images and the redundant calculations
on the overlapping patches will lead to low training and
predicting efficiency. As for the global approaches [3], [4],
calculations are directly performed on the full image with
convolutional neural networks (CNNs). However, the input
images are generally required to be enlarged or shrunk to a
fixed scale for CNNs. Enlarging will lead to the introduction
of new resampling traces in images, and shrinking will discard
the details of intrinsic features especially for small tampered
areas. Both enlarging and shrinking may deteriorate image
fraud identification.
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In this paper, we continue moving forward along the
research line of global methods and propose a framework
for directly training images of original input scales without
resizing. Although spatial pyramid pooling (SPP) [5] is the first
work proposed to solve the problem of arbitrary-sized image
training, only few resolutions are predefined in SPP-net and the
images still need to be rescaled to the predefined resolutions. It
is also possible to completely bypass the resizing operation if
setting the mini-batch size to 1, where the model optimization
actually adopts stochastic gradient descent, i.e. SGD. In this
case, both batch sizes used to estimate gradients (hereafter
referred to as the input batch) and to update model parameters
(hereafter referred to as the update batch) are 1, so the model
will converge in a slow and oscillating way. In the proposed
framework, our arbitrary-sized image training method mainly
depends on the pseudo-batch gradient descent (PBGD), which
bridges the gap between the input batch and the update batch.
PBGD accumulates the gradients sequentially and makes up-
dates adaptively. That is to say, the input batch size is a certain
number in PBGD, while the update batch size can be another
number no less than the input batch size, as shown in Figure 1.
To adapt our framework for image fraud identification, we
also propose a residual kernel learning method to extract image
noise residuals that have specific patterns for both copy-move
and splicing forgeries. Recent research shows that 3 noise
filters [4] are sufficient to generate noise residual features.
Nevertheless, these filters (i.e. residual kernels) are fixed as
preprocessing during learning, which is hard to simulate the
complicated and ever-changing noise residual distributions on
images. In our work, the residual kernel weights are trained
together with the other layers in the network in a 3-phase
alternate training fashion. First, the residual kernel layers
are frozen and the remaining are trained. Then, freeze the
latter while training the former, and alternate between training
and freezing. Finally, relax and train both of them simultane-
ously. Although the residual kernel layers usually have weak
gradients during back propagation due to their being at the
bottom of CNNs, this alternate training strategy can assure that
better residual kernels are learnt while preventing vanishing
gradients. The proposed framework is evaluated on several
standard datasets for image fraud identification, achieving the
state-of-the-art results as well as demonstrating superiority on
small tampered regions and strong generalization capability to
new dataset.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are two folds:
1) the introduction of PBGD in the proposed framework
makes it possible to train arbitrarily-sized images, and achieves
better performance in image classification through avoiding
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Fig. 1. The proposed framewrok for image fraud identification. The residual kernel layer is essentially a convolution layer and can be ignored for general-
purposed learning tasks. The noise residuals are nonlinearly transformed by the feature extraction layers followed by the SPP layer. With PBGD and SPP,
arbitrary-sized images can be fed into the network to accumulate gradients for optimization.
the semantic category change caused by cropping, scaling or
warping. 2) the optimal residual kernels are learnt with a 3-
phase alternate training strategy and can significantly improve
the accuracy for image fraud identification.
II. RELATED WORKS
This work is mainly related to three research fields, gradient
descent, image feature representation, and image forgery de-
tection. This section will briefly introduce related works from
the above three aspects.
A. Gradient Descent
Gradient descent is widely used to optimize neural networks
[6], which minimizes an objective function by updating the
parameters in the opposite direction of the gradient. Gradient
descent can vary in terms of the number of training examples
used to calculate error and update the model. The three main
variants of gradient descent are batch, stochastic, and mini-
batch. Batch gradient descent (BGD) calculates the error and
updates the model on all training examples, but stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) does for each example in the training
dataset. As a trade-off between SGD and BGD, mini-batch
gradient descent (MBGD) splits the training dataset into small
batches that are used to calculate error and update model
coefficients, which is opposed to the SGD batch size of 1
example, and the BGD size of all training examples. MBGD
seeks to find a balance between the robustness of SGD and the
efficiency of BGD [7]. It is the most common implementation
of gradient descent used in the field of deep learning.
The structure of tensors in mainstream machine learning
platforms, such as TensorFlow, makes the implementation of
MBGD more efficient, which requires that images in each
batch must be of same size. Our work aims to relax this strict
requirement to handle arbitrarily varying input scales in the
practical implementations.
B. Image Feature Representation
Image feature representation with fixed length has been
widely studied in computer vision communities. Bag-of-Visual-
Words is the basis of many modern features [8] for image
3recognition and retrieval. It treats image descriptors as visual
words, whose counts of occurrence are computed to form the
final representation. Varied descriptors are normalized to fixed-
length vectors as image feature representation. Spatial Pyramid
Matching (SPM) is an extension of the orderless BoVW repre-
sentation [9] by computing histograms inside each subregion.
Via introducing the geometric relationship, the performance
is significantly improved beyond simple BoVW. SPP based
networks [5], [10], [11] are inspired from SPM and aim to
convert varied-sized feature maps in CNNs into fixed-length
feature vectors while reserving the geometric information. The
main disadvantage of these networks is that they can be
trained only with few specified resolutions, still causing loss of
information. To solve this problem, [12] adopted SGD instead
of mini-batch SGD during training and conducted studies on a
small network. Since large-scale networks such as VGG [13]
are hard to converge with SGD, we still need to reconstruct the
implementation for fixed-length image feature representation.
C. Image Forgery Detection
It has been widely recognized that the key to detect image
forgery lies in the low-level image artifacts, including wavelet
subbands, low-level image descriptors, color filter array (CFA)
and image noise residuals.
For copy-move forgeries, [1] extracts similar singular vec-
tors of low-frequency blocks in wavelet subbands, and [2]
instead utilizes SURF [14] in the YCbCr space as the image
descriptor. For splicing forgeries, image features are calculated
on block discrete cosine transform (DCT) in [2]. [15] identifies
copy-move and splicing with a joint method using the local
binary pattern descriptor. CFA based methods analyze camera
internal filter patterns, assuming CFA structures in the tam-
pered images have been damaged. For example, [16] detects
the presence of CFA in images to identify the forgery.
Recently, image noise residuals, obtained using high-pass
filters, have shown increasing significance, especially for ste-
ganalysis rich model (SRM) [17]. Under the assumption that
splicing and host images are characterized by different feature
parameters, [18] localizes splicing regions based on local
image residuals. [3] uses the SRM filters as the bottom layer
of CNNs to boost the forgery detection accuracy. [4] combines
noise residuals with RGB features via bilinear pooling. In fact,
noise residuals are more significant than RGB contents for
image forgery detection and three SRM filtering kernels are
sufficient to determine the presence of the forgery. And what
is more, residual kernels can be further optimized through
iterative training on the basis of the SRM filters.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Image Fraud Identification
Different from image forgery detection, image fraud iden-
tification aims to distinguish fraudulent images from genuine
ones. As a consequence, we treat it as an image binary classifi-
cation problem on the basis of CNNs. The key to classification
is to extract image features and then train a classifier with
them. Based on recent advances on image forgery detecion, we
expect to use image noise residuals to identify forged images.
However, unfortunately, the microstructure in image noise
residuals is vulnerable to the image resizing operation. The
effect of resizing on tampered areas is especially substantial,
which can be observed from Figure 2. The 1st and 3rd rows
show the original images of size 384 × 256 and 480 × 640
respectively, where tampered regions are marked out with red
boxes. When the images are rescaled to 224× 224, as shown
in the 2nd and 4th rows, the structures of noise residuals will
be corrupted, especially for small tampered regions. The last
two columns present the residuals obtained separately with the
SRM filters and our learnt kernels.
Considering the devastating impact of the resizing operation
on image noise residuals, we propose a framework for image
fraud identification through sequentially concatenating noise
residual layer, feature extraction layers, SPP and softmax,
as shown in Figure 1. The noise residual layer is placed
before networks and used to learn residual kernels, which
will be optimized with an alternate training strategy (Section
III-D). This layer is in essence a convolutional operation as
well and can be removed from the framework for general-
purposed tasks. Feature extraction layers can be any backbone
of prevailing CNNs such as VGG. SPP is added on the top of
the last convolutional layer to ensure that the vector length
of extracted features is uniform for arbitrary-sized images.
Softmax layer is the last layer and resides at the end of SPP
for classification.
In our implementation for training, each image is respec-
tively fed to the network to deal with but model parameters
are not updated until multiple gradients are accumulated. This
optimization process, called pseudo-batch gradient descent,
can guarantee that arbitrary-sized images are trainable on
the original image scales when combining together with SPP.
It is arbitrary-sized image training that preserves the fine
microstructures in the noise residuals and thus results in better
fraud identification performance.
B. Pseudo-batch Gradient Descent
In this work, the loss function is defined as the cross-entropy
loss J(θ) with regards to model parameters θ ∈ Rd. To op-
timize neural networks, gradient descent algorithms generally
compute the loss JB(θ) on a batch B through summing the
loss Jxi,yi(θ) on each example of this batch,
JB(θ) = α
∑
xi,yi∈B
Jxi,yi(θ). (1)
Here α is a scaling coefficient, xi denotes an input image and
yi its corresponding label in a batch. And model parameters
are updated in the following way:
θ ← θ − η∇θJB(θ), (2)
where η is the learning rate.
The dilemma one may face in the practical implementation
is that uniform tensors used in existing deep learning libraries
cannot simultaneously handle images of varied sizes in a
batch if without resizing or cropping beforehand. As a matter
of fact, the mini-batch specified in these libraries involves
both the images for computing gradients with tensors and
4!"#$%&"'()$ !*#$+"&,(-(.$"-(")$ !/#$-()%.0"1)$2%+3
456$7%1+(-)
!.#$-()%.0"1)$2%+3
1("-8+$9(-8(1)
5:2$;<
=&"'($;$2%+3$
:-%'%8"1$)%>(
5:2$?<
=&"'($;$"7+(-$
-()%>%8'
5:2$@<
=&"'($?$2%+3$
:-%'%8"1$)%>(
5:2$A<
=&"'($?$"7+(-$
-()%>%8'
Fig. 2. The effect of resizing on tampered areas. The 1st and 3rd rows are two images with original sizes: 384×256 and 480×640, where the red boxes
represent the tampered areas respectively with the copy-move and splicing manipulations. When they were shrunk to 224×224 (2nd and 4th rows), the
tampered areas would be resized and thus the noise residuals (3rd and 4th columns) became poor distinctly. The last column shows that the residuals obtained
with the learnt residual kernels are significant on tampered areas for original images. Best viewed in color.
those for parameter updates. To achieve arbitrary-sized image
training, we separate the batch into two independent ones in
our implementation, namely the input batch Bni of size ni
and the update batch Bnu of size nu. That is, our method
calculates the gradients for ni examples on Bni at the same
time for a tensor, but only updates the model coefficients after
aggregating nu examples on Bnu at each iteration. In this case,
the parameter update process can be reformulated as:
θ ← θ − η
∑
Bni⊆Bnu
∇θJBni (θ), (3)
where Bni is a subset of Bnu . Since the input batch Bni
works only for computing the gradients, it is actually a pseudo-
batch. The real batch for parameter updates is Bnu . Since ni
is often specified as a variable to the mini-batch size, we call
our implementation method as pseudo-batch gradient descent
(PBGD) in this work.
In practice, there are two parameters regarding batch size,
ni and nu, to be preset in our method. For simplicity, nu can
be initialized with a constant integer. It is worth noting that
nu can be adaptively evaluated as well during training. For
instance, denote N as the average pixel number of an image
in the training set, and wxi , hxi as the width and height of
the i-th image xi. For training images with different scales,
nu can be described as the minimal number of images whose
total pixels are not less than N , and worked out as follows,
nu = ⌊n⌋,
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(wxi × hxi) ≥ N
5where ⌊·⌋ denotes the lower limit operation.
As discussed in Section II-A, there is a close relationship
between PBGD with BGD, SGD, and MBGD. In practical
applications, when nu is the same as ni, PBGD turns into
MBGD. It becomes SGD when both nu and ni are 1, and
degenerates to BGD when nu equals the amount of all training
examples.
C. Arbitrary-sized Image Training
Arbitrary-sized image training with CNNs is of great sig-
nificance for image fraud identification as image resizing will
damage potential noise residuals of primitive images. However,
there are two challenges in arbitrary-sized image training.
On one hand, the last layer, softmax, in CNNs generally
requires fixed-length vectors as input. But if prohibiting the
cropping or scaling operations, the length of extracted feature
vectors will vary with the input image size. To resolve this
problem, we place a SPP layer between the feature extraction
layer and the softmax layer. SPP can fix the output feature size
and finally generate fixed-length feature vectors from arbitrary-
sized input images.
On the other hand, the mini-batch size we can change is
actually used for uniform tensors in deep learning libraries.
If images are various in size, this batch size can only be set
1 and thus the gradient descent algorithm amounts to SGD.
That will lead to the low converging stability. So we use the
proposed PBGD method and rewrite the standard library codes
for implemention in PyTorch. At this time, the input batch size
ni is assigned 1 for arbitrary-sized image training.
D. Residual Kernel Learning
Image noise residuals are critical to image fraud iden-
tification due to its meaningful microstructure within the
local regions [19]. Specifically, under copy-move forgeries,
microstructures show discontinuities and structural damages.
Splicing forgeries are easy to be identified when detecting
the mixture of different residual patterns due to the fact
that some noise residuals exist specifically in an individual
image. Various kernels have been designated to extract image
noise residuals, e.g. SRM [17], and they are also learnable in
deep neural networks [3]. The residual kernel layers usually
locate in front of feature extraction layers and have weak
gradients for updates. Hence, a 3-phase alternate training
schedule is designed and utilized for learning residual kernels
in this work, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the first phase, the
parameters of residual kernels are frozen and the other layers
are trained. Then we only train the residual layer while fixing
the remaining. Finally, all parameters are relaxed and trained
together after alternately iterating the first two phases until
convergence.
In practical applications, our residual kernels are initialized
by the three most significant SRM filters in the first column of
Figure 4. In image fraud identification, our 3-phase alternate
training makes a fine distinction between the initial kernels and
the learnt ones, as presented in Figure 4. The learnt kernels
are different as well for three color channels, r, g, and b. Let
us get back to the two image examples in Figure 2. It is easily
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Fig. 3. 3-phase alternate training strategy.
observed that the noise residuals (the 4th column), obtained
with the learnt kernels, look clearer than the counterparts (the
3rd column) with the original SRM filters. More significantly,
the structures of the residuals the learnt kernels extract for
original images are more normal on tampered regions than
those after resizing. And the considerably improved accuracy
in our experiments of Section IV-C also corroborate our
assumption that the well trained residual kernels are more
beneficial to image fraud identification.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we used the following four standard
datasets: CASIA v1.0 and v2.0 [20], Columbia [21], and
COVER[22], as listed in Table I. The CASIA v1.0 dataset
contains 800 authentic and 921 forged color images 459 of
which are copy-move forged, and the remaining are spliced.
Different geometric transformations, such as scaling and rotat-
ing, have been applied on the forged images. All the images
have a size of 384×256 in the JPEG format. The CASIA
2.0 includes 7,491 authentic and 5,123 forged color images
with size ranging from 240×60 to 900×600 in the JPEG,
BMP or TIFF formats. The Columbia image database consists
of 183 authentic and 180 spliced images in either TIFF or
BMP formats. The images are uncompressed and vary in
size from 757x568 to 1152x768. COVER is composed of
100 originalforged image pairs with image size of 400×486,
and only focuses on the copy-move forgery. This dataset is
challenging since it covers similar objects at the pasted regions
to conceal the tampering artifacts.
These available benchmark datasets are usually small-scale
and directly training CNNs with them is prone to model
overfitting. To eliminate the problem, we collected a set of
data comprising of 84k forged images from the PS-Battle
dataset [23] , 11,833 forged ones from the Zhou dataset [24],
and 100k authentic ones from the Place365 dataset [25] to
increase the diversity of training examples. In this collection,
the image side length ranges from below 100 pixels through
20,000 pixels. For forged images, the tampered region sizes
vary a lot and several tampering techniques were applied, e.g.
copy-move, splicing and partial removal. This diversity in the
image resolutions, the tampered region sizes and the tampering
techniques helps pre-train a more powerful model with the
capability of better representation and strong generalization.
6Fig. 4. The learnable residual kernels. The left column lists three SRM filters used for initialization. The right three columns illustrate the learnt kernels for
r, g, and b channels, respectively. Best viewed in color.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF FOUR BENCHMARK DATASETS. THERE ARE ONLY TWO
CATEGORIES IN EACH DATASET: AUTHENTIC (AU.) CATEGORY AND
FORGED (FO.) CATEGORY.
dataset
amount tampering
size format
au. fo. type
CASIA v1.0 800 921
copy-move
splicing
384× 256 JPEG
CASIA v2.0 7,491 5,123
copy-move
splicing
240 × 60 ∼
900× 600
JPEG
BMP
TIFF
Columbia 183 180 splicing
757× 568 ∼
1152 × 768
BMP
TIFF
COVER 100 100 copy-move 400× 486 TIFF
In addition, a toy dataset, named Square, was also synthe-
sized and studied for analyzing the impact of resizing on the
classification performance. It comprises of 12,000 images from
2 classes, square and non-square. The image aspect ratio in
this dataset ranges from 0.6 to 1.67 and some examples are
displayed in the top row of Figure 5.
The accuracy acts as the metric for performance evaluation,
which can be formulated as follows:
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (4)
where TP , TN , FP and FN represent the number of
true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative
examples respectively.
All the experiments were performed on a server with
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 16G memory
and a NVIDIA GeForce TITAN X (Pascal) GPU.
Fig. 5. Some examples of the Square dataset. The first row shows the original
images from the dataset and the second row is the counterparts after resizing
to a fixed size. The images with red borders are with class label ’square’ and
those with green are ’non-square’. The semantic categories are messed after
the resizing operation. Best viewed in color.
B. Analysis on Arbitrary-sized Image Training
To verify the effect of the proposed framework on arbitrary-
sized image training, we conducted tests involving image
classification on the Square dataset. In these experiments, we
removed the residual layer from our framework, and adopted
the backbone of VGG16 [13] as feature extraction layers. For
the purpose of comparison, the original VGG16 using the
7resizing operation and its modified version VGG16-p with
PBGD were tested on the same dataset as well. In order
to distinguish our method from others by name, we named
it VGG16-sp in this case. The notable difference between
VGG16-sp and the other two is that the former can accept
arbitrary-sized images as input, but the latters require the
resizing operation to produce images of fixed size (224×224).
In our experiments, model parameters were initialized with
the weights pre-trained on ImageNet. The learning rate in
PBGD was initially set to 0.0001, and divided by 10 when the
validation accuracy did not improve in consecutive 5 epochs.
All models were trained for 10 epochs with update batch sizes
(nu) of 4 and 8, and the SPP layers were constructed with 3-
scale outputs, 1×1, 2×2 and 4×4. To no one’s surprise, the
VGG16-sp performed 100 percent correctly on this synthetic
dataset, much better than both VGG16 and VGG16-p, as
shown in Table II.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ON THE SQUARE DATASET WITH DIFFERENT STRATEGIES
OF SCALING AND GRADIENT UPDATES.
network
batch size (nu)
nu = 4 nu = 8
VGG16 0.5257 0.5712
VGG16-p 0.6523 0.5013
VGG16-sp 1.0 1.0
From the experimental results, we observed that VGG16 and
VGG16-p almost resulted in random guesses, mainly due to
the resizing operation altering the original semantic context in
images. Some examples are demonstrated in Figure 5. When
the original images (top row) were resized to a fixed size
(bottom row), the ’square’ shape embedded in the images
(first 3 columns) changed to the general rectangle ’non-square’,
and contrarily the non-square in the last column deformed to
the square. However, the arbitrary-sized image training surely
keeps unchanged the semantic features in images through
PBGD plus SPP. SPP sets free the CNNs from the constraint
of the fixed size and PBGD resolves the discrepancy between
the parameter update and the tensor design in deep learning
libraries. This highlights the practical significance of the
proposed framework to image classification.
C. Analysis on Image Fraud Identification
Our empirical studies also revealed that VGG16 performed
the best if we set VGG13, VGG16, VGG19 and AlexNet
respectively as the backbone for feature extraction layers in
the proposed framework. As a result, we selected VGG16 as
the backbone for image fraud identification in the following
experiments. Our collected data was randomly split into two
subsets, training (80%) and validation (20%), and used to pre-
train a fraud identification model.
1) Improvement with Residual Kernel Learning: Image
fraud identification pays more attentions to noise residuals
than common image classification tasks. In order to find better
residual kernels, we executed the training on the collected data
with the 3-phase alternate training strategy in the proposed
TABLE III
VALIDATION ACCURACY WITH THE ALTERNATE TRAINING STRATEGY
iteration
no. residual-frozen non-residual-frozen
1 0.9634 0.9599
2 0.9769 0.9791
3 0.9816 0.9813
all-relaxed 0.9903
framework. The residual kernels were initialized with the SRM
filters [17] and continued to be optimized until they were
able to better describe noise residuals. In the following, our
method is named VGG16-spk for the convenience of memory.
As shown in Table III, the learnt residual kernels can obviously
improve the validation accuracy, from 0.9634 to 0.9813, after
three alternate iterations. When all model parameters were
relaxed for further training at the last phase, the accuracy
increased to 0.9903. Nine resulting kernels are shown in the
right three columns of Figure 4.
For fair comparison, two baselines named VGG16-k and
VGG16-sp were trained on the collected data respectively.
VGG16-k was based on VGG-16, but rather filtered input
images with learnt residual kernels after resizing. Figure 6
illustrated the validation accuracy of these three methods.
The results unveiled the significance of residual kernel learn-
ing to the proposed framework, where VGG16-spk achieved
better accuracy than VGG16-sp. It is also understandable
that VGG16-k performed worst as the resizing operation has
already damaged the noise residuals.
To further validate the effect of the learnt kernels, we also
conducted tests on CASIA v2.0 with different networks. Here,
the CASIA v2.0 dataset was split into 6 disjoint groups five of
which were used for finetuning and the left for test. Another
method, called VGG16-spf, was also tested for comparative
analysis. This method is basically identical to VGG16-spk
except that the residual kernels kept unchanged once initial-
izing with the SRM filters. As seen in Table IV, VGG16-spk
had the best average accuracy of 0.9947 among all methods.
More significantly, using the residual kernels learnt with the
alternate training strategy, we improved the accuracy over 1%
than VGG16-spf using the original SRM filters, nearly 3%
than VGG16-sp only using the RGB content, and almost 8%
than VGG16-k combining the learnt residual kernels with the
resizing operation.
TABLE IV
ACCURACY OF DIFFERENT METHODS ON CASIA V2.0 AND ITS SUBSETS
INVOLVING DIFFERENT TAMPERED REGION SIZES.
method
tampered region
CASIA v2.0
small medium large
VGG16-k 0.9122 0.9506 0.9682 0.9176
VGG16-sp 0.9615 0.9741 1.0 0.9649
VGG16-spf 0.9831 0.9803 1.0 0.9829
VGG16-spk 0.9953 0.9924 1.0 0.9947
2) Superiority on Small Tampered Regions: Small tampered
regions often happened to fraudulent images, especially for
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Fig. 6. The validation accuracy and convergence rate of VGG16-k, VGG16-
sp and VGG16-spk. The dash and solid lines respectively denote the change
of training loss and validation accuracy with epochs. Best viewed in color.
loan or insurance frauds in Internet finance business. As
stated previously, the main advantage of arbitrary-sized image
training is that it can guarantee that the fine features in
small regions will not be changed during training. Specifically,
to analyze this superiority in image fraud identification, we
classified the CASIA v2.0 dataset into three subsets, large,
medium, and small, in terms of the tampered region size.
A tampered region is generally defined as small if its area
accounts for below 20% of the whole image area, large if
over 50%, and medium otherwise.
Separately computing the accuracy of three subsets, we can
find that the arbitrary-sized image training strategy, adopted
in the bottom three methods of Table IV, was obviously more
beneficial to small tampered regions than that of resizing
images to a fixed size in the VGG16-k method. The pro-
posed framework VGG16-spk gained over 8% in the small
subset, which is the superiority of residual kernel learning and
arbitrary-sized image training towards image fraud identifica-
tion.
3) Generalization to New Dataset: COVER is a small
dataset and therefore is unsuitable for solely training deep mod-
els. Here we conducted tests on the COVER dataset directly
with the finetuned model on CASIA v2.0, so as to evaluate the
generalization capability of the proposed method. Traditional
methods, SIFT[26], SURF[27], and Dense-Field [28], were
selected as the baselines, and the corresponding results are
available in [22]. For fair comparison, from each original-
forged pair, we randomly picked one to predict. As shown in
Table V, the proposed method, VGG16-spk, outperformed the
cutting-edge Dense-Field by nearly 5% in accuracy. It strongly
corroborates a fact that our method has better generalization
ability for unknown images.
TABLE V
ACCURACY ON THE COVER DATASET
SIFT SURF Dense-Field VGG16-spk
0.5050 0.5860 0.7180 0.7650
4) Comparison with Other Methods : For comprehensive
analysis, we tested the proposed method on three standard
datasets, Columbia, CASIA v1.0 and v2.0, and compared it
with four state-of-the-art methods, Rao [3], Muhammad [15],
Shi [29], and Zhao [30], in this experiment. From Table VI,
we observed the proposed method achieved best results on all
datasets. It is worth noting that our method is more suitable for
datasets with various (CASIA v2.0) or large (Columbia) image
sizes. For image sets with fixed size and small resolution, the
performance superiority is not that much. In particular, the
proposed method only improved 0.27 percent in accuracy on
CASIA v1.0, but the gain can reach 1.64 percent on CASIA
v2.0 and 3.03 percent on Columbia over the SOTA results.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS ON THREE DATASETS.
method CASIA v1.0 CASIA v2.0 Columbia
Rao 0.9804 0.9783 -
Muhammad 0.9489 0.9733 0.9639
Shi - 0.8486 -
Zhao - - 0.9314
VGG16-spk 0.9831 0.9947 0.9942
D. Computational Performance
To thoroughly analyze the computational performance of
the proposed method, we examined the training and inference
time cost separately.
During the 3-phase alternate training, the residual kernel
learning is very fast as there are few weights to optimize
in residual kernels when non-residual layers are frozen. As
a consequence, its computational cost can be ignored in the
whole training period and we will focus more on computation
overhead of the arbitrary-sized image training.
In this experiment, we compared our training strategy
VGG16-sp with several other methods, VGG16, VGG16-bn,
VGG16-gn and VGG16-s. All methods are based on the
VGG16 backbone, where VGG16 is the original version,
VGG16-bn and VGG16-gn respectively adopt batch normal-
ization and group normalization, VGG16-s means to add a
SPP layer to the backbone, and VGG16-sp updates parameters
with PBGD besides adding the SPP layer. In this case, the mini-
batch size of VGG16-s was set to 1 and the other mini-batch
sizes were 16. As to VGG16-sp, the input batch size ni and
update batch size nu were respectively 1 and 16. Each method
ran 10 epochs on the same dataset and its average training time
was computed in terms of epochs. As illustrated in Table VII,
VGG16-sp is more efficient than VGG16-s through avoiding
frequent back-propagation, but slower than the others because
the arbitrary-sized image training can not take advantage of the
tensor structure in deep learning libraries to quickly calculate
multiple gradients once.
Next we studied the impact of the update batch size nu
on computation overhead in the arbitrary-sized image training.
It is well known that the overall training time is mainly
composed of two components, one for accumulating prediction
errors and the other for model updates. The input batch size ni
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COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE TRAINING TIME PER EPOCH WITH
DIFFERENT METHODS.
method
VGG16
/ -bn -gn -sp -s
time(s) 19.2 21.3 25.6 55.7 68.8
TABLE VIII
THE AVERAGE TRAINING TIME (S) OF VARIOUS UPDATE BATCH SIZES (nu)
PER EPOCH.
nu 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128
time 17.2 14.0 12.4 11.7 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.3
was unchanged (always 1) in the arbitrary-sized image training,
so the overall training time for an epoch is primarily dependent
on the model update time. When nu is small, the updating
process has to be frequently called and the computational cost
will be high. With the increase of nu, the overhead should
decrease gradually. However, the updates require the additional
complexity of computing gradients across nu training exam-
ples. Accordingly, model updates, and in turn training speed,
may become slow for large nu.
Our experiments confirmed the conclusion obtained from
the above analysis. Table VIII presents the average training
time per epoch with regards to nu varying from 1 to 128. The
training cost decreased quickly for smaller nu but stably stayed
around 11 seconds when nu became no less than 16. As a
result, it is reasonable and practical to set the update batch size
to 16 in real applications. Moreover, our experiments in Figure
6 demonstrated that VGG-spk with nu of 16 can converge
much faster than VGG-k and basically as quickly as VGG-sp.
Since the proposed method can take arbitrary-sized image as
input, its inference time should be closely correlated with the
input image size. The inference time involving different image
resolutions from 224×224 through 1920×1920 is shown in
Table IX. It can be observed that the inference time increased
roughly linearly with the image resolution and reached to
168.4 ms for the image of 1920×1920, which was quick
enough and thus acceptable to real-time image fraud identi-
fication.
TABLE IX
THE INFERENCE TIME PER IMAGE OF DIFFERENT INPUT RESOLUTIONS
resolution 224×224 512×512 1024×1024 1920×1920
time (ms) 4.3 14.6 55.1 168.4
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, for the purpose of arbitrary-sized image
training, we proposed pseudo-batch gradient descent (PBGD)
and redesigned the key modules in deep learning libraries
to accumulate gradients sequentially on the update batch.
To improve the performance on image fraud identification,
we conceived a 3-phase alternate training strategy to learn
optimal residual kernels. Leveraging residual kernel learning
and PBGD, the proposed framework effectively extracted and
preserved image noise residuals in original images. Exten-
sive experimental evaluation demonstrated that the proposed
method outperformed the commonly used fixed-sized training
strategy for image classification thanks to its salient strength
in preserving semantic contexts of images during training.
More significantly, for image fraud identification, our method
achieved the state-of-the-art results as well, especially for
images with small tampered regions or unseen images with
different tampering distributions.
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